Brief for Appellee: Second Annual Pace National Environmental Moot Court Competition by Gluck, Richard D. & Gorham, William J., III
Pace Environmental Law Review
Volume 7
Issue 2 Spring 1990 Article 10
April 1990
Brief for Appellant: Second Annual Pace National
Environmental Moot Court Competition
Southern Illinois University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace
Environmental Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Southern Illinois University School of Law, Brief for Appellant: Second Annual Pace National
Environmental Moot Court Competition, 7 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 433 (1990)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol7/iss2/10
No. 89-27
IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TWELFTH CIRCUIT
CITY OF NORTHWOOD,
Appellant,
V.
SECRETARY, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
and
MULTI-CHEM CHEMICAL CO.,
Appellees.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT*
Southern Illinois
University School of Law
Neal Perryman
Jeffrey C. Toothaker
Arthur B. DeBruyn
Counsel for Appellant
* The winning briefs published in this issue are reprinted substantially in their
original form. The editorial staff of the Pace Environmental Law Review made minor
revisions to citation form and spelling. The outline, writing style, and use of case and
statutory law remains that of each group of authors.
1
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Whether the district court erred in dismissing the City
of Northwood's request for an order to the Department
of the Interior to perform a natural resource damage as-
sessment and recover damages from Multi-Chem Chemi-
cal Company under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)?
II. Whether the district court erred in dismissing the City
of Northwood's CERCLA action for natural resource
damages against Multi-Chem Chemical Company?
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action arose from a pesticide leak that contaminated
an underground aquifer connected to the Northwood National
Wildlife Refuge. The contamination poses a grave danger to
thousands of birds that use the refuge because the pesticide
ingredients have been linked to nervous system damage
among bird populations. Preliminary tests have found pesti-
cides present in the waters on the refuge, but more complete
sampling is necessary to determine the full extent of the con-
tamination. The City of Northwood, New Union, filed this
suit to force the United States Department of the Interior to
complete the testing and assess natural resource damages
against the chemical company responsible for the leak. In the
alternative, the city sought permission to sue the chemical
company directly. The lower court held that neither action
was allowed under the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
I. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The appellant, the City of Northwood, is located approxi-
mately thirty miles north of New Union City, the capital of
the State of New Union. (R. 1). Northwood's boundaries com-
pletely enclose the Northwood National Wildlife Refuge,
which is a stopping point for waterfowl along an important
flyway. (R. 1, 2). Because thousands of birds use the refuge's
marshes and wetlands during their fall and spring migration,
the refuge plays a vital role in the ecosystem of North Ameri-
can waterfowl. (R. 1, 2). The United States Department of the
Interior has concluded that if the refuge were replaced by de-
velopment, the bird population would drop significantly. (R.
1).
The refuge also plays a major role in the economic and
environmental vitality of the City of Northwood. (R. 1, 2).
Once a thriving industrial town, Northwood suffered a severe
economic setback when many industries left the area follow-
ing World War II. (R. 1). The unemployment rate rose, and
the city's economy looked bleak. (R. 1). In the last ten years,
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however, Northwood's economy has improved markedly,
mainly due to an influx of young professionals who bought
homes in Northwood and commute to work in New Union
City. (R. 1).
One of the main reasons for Northwood's popularity
among these affluent commuters is the Northwood National
Wildlife Refuge. (R. 1). The refuge serves as an important vis-
ual and noise buffer between the city and the highway corri-
dor on the opposite end of the refuge. (R. 2). The refuge also
features a network of trails for biking, hiking and birdwatch-
ing. (R. 2). The city's strong affinity with the refuge is perhaps
best illustrated by the large number of cars sporting bumper
stickers which read, "Northwood: We're for the birds." (R. 2).
Although the refuge is owned and administered by the United
States Department of the Interior, which is one of the appel-
lees, the city's ordinances apply within the refuge and the city
supplies utilities such as fire protection and trash removal to
the refuge. (R. 1, 2).
Until recently, Northwood also was the home of a small
pesticide processing plant owned by the other appellee, the
Multi-Chem Chemical Company. (R. 2). The plant, which was
located within the city limits just outside the refuge's bound-
ary, was closed in 1985 when Multi-Chem consolidated its op-
erations into one of its larger facilities. (R. 2). Shortly before
the plant closed, however, the city's health department dis-
covered several Multi-Chem pesticide ingredients in the
drinking water wells of homes located near the plant. (R. 2).
The ingredients, which all meet the test for "hazardous sub-
stances" under federal law and are not naturally occurring,
were found downgradient - i.e., downstream in the under-
ground aquifer - from the plant. (R. 2).
The city closed the contaminated wells and connected the
affected homes to the city's water system in 1987 at a cost of
$230,000. (R. 3). Without admitting liability and without the
city's waiver of any legal claims, Multi-Chem agreed to reim-
burse the city for these costs in 1988. (R. 3). The city, how-
ever, remains concerned about the refuge and its waterfowl
because articles in the academic literature have linked the
pesticides to nervous system damage among bird populations.
1990]
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(R. 3).
The shallow aquifer in which the pesticides were found is
believed to flow from the Multi-Chem plant, underneath the
homes tested by the city, and onward to the wetlands and
marshes within the refuge. (R. 2). Preliminary testing by the
city showed some pesticides present in the refuge waters, but
all the parties agree that more complete sampling over several
seasons of the year is necessary to determine the full extent to
which the contamination has entered the surface waters of the
refuge. (R. 2, 3).
The Interior Department has indicated that it would like
to perform a damage assessment on the refuge but cannot af-
ford one. (R. 4). The estimated cost of performing the assess-
ment is $1.1 million. (R. 4). The Department concedes that it
could legally spend part of its $100 million general operations
budget for the assessment. (R. 4). However, the Secretary of
the Interior has decided that the money would be better spent
on daily upkeep of the various refuges, employee salaries, and
some long-planned repairs and improvements for refuge
buildings throughout the system. (R. 4). The Department has
refused to ask Congress for a line-item appropriation in its
budget to pay for the assessment. (R. 4). The Department
contends that even if the request were granted, the money
would come out of the Department's general appropriation,
thus reducing the amount of funds available for the other ref-
uge operations. (R. 4, 5).
The governor of New Union has appointed several state
officials as natural resources trustees. (R. 5). However, the
governor declined to appoint the mayor of Northwood as a
trustee for the resources in Northwood. (R. 5, 6). The desig-
nated state trustees have said that they, too, lack sufficient
funds to conduct a damage assessment at the refuge. (R. 6).
II. THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Northwood brought this suit in 1989 under the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil-
ity Act (CERCLA) §§ 103-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982
& Supp. V 1987). (R. 3).
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In its first cause of action, the city sought an order under
CERCLA's citizen suit provision, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 to force the
Interior Department to fulfill its role as "natural resources
trustee" for the refuge as required by section 107(f) of CER-
CLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f). (R. 3). The city wants the Depart-
ment to complete the testing necessary to assess natural re-
source damages against Multi-Chem. (R. 3). The funds
recovered from Multi-Chem would be used to build an aquifer
treatment plant to cleanse the groundwater and to restock the
bird population if it falls below present levels. (R. 3).
In the alternative, the city's second cause of action sought
permission for the city to act as natural resources trustee
under section 107(f) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f), thereby
allowing the city to file its own suit against Multi-Chem for
natural resource damages. (R. 3).
The Interior Department and Multi-Chem filed motions
to dismiss the suit. (R. 3). The Interior Department argued
that CERCLA does not authorize the city to seek an order
forcing the Department to take action; but the Department
supported the city's efforts to serve as natural resources trus-
tee under CERCLA. (R. 3). Multi-Chem argued that the city
is not authorized to serve as natural resources trustee. (R. 3).
The lower court granted both motions to dismiss. (R. 5,
6). The court ruled that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over the first cause of action because CERCLA's citizen suit
provision can be used only to force a government official to
perform a nondiscretionary duty. (R. 4, 5). The court said the
Interior Department's decision not to perform a damage as-
sessment was within the Department's discretionary author-
ity. (R. 5). On the second cause of action, the lower court held
that CERCLA does not authorize a municipality to act as a
natural resources trustee. (R. 6). The court said CERCLA
gives such authority only to federal and state officials, and
that municipalities do not come within CERCLA's definition
of a state. (R. 5, 6).
The city subsequently filed petitions to appeal, and this
court granted the petitions.
1990]
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Section 107(f) of CERCLA provides that liability for
damages to natural resources shall be to the United States
government or to the states that own, manage or control the
resources. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f). The President is required to
designate federal officials who shall act on behalf of the public
as trustees of the nation's natural resources. Id. §
9607(f)(2)(A). The section further requires that such trustees
shall assess damages to natural resources for the purpose of
recovering such damages from the responsible party. Id.
These provisions of CERCLA impose upon the Interior
Department a nondiscretionary duty (1) to act as a natural
resources trustee and (2) to conduct damage assessments for
resources protected by the trustee. The mandatory character
of this duty, which is evident from CERCLA's plain language
and statutory purpose, belies the lower court's finding that
the decision to conduct a damage assessment is a discretion-
ary enforcement decision.
Under CERCLA's citizen suit provision, any person - in-
cluding municipalities - may file suit to force a federal offi-
cial to perform a nondiscretionary duty. Id. § 9659. Therefore,
the lower court erred in holding that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over this suit to force the Interior Department to
conduct a damage assessment at the Northwood National
Wildlife Refuge.
The lower court also erred in ruling that a municipality
may not serve as a natural resources trustee. CERCLA's natu-
ral resource damage provisions, when taken in context and
read as a whole, require that municipalities be allowed to act
as trustees to preserve their own natural resources.
Section 107(f) provides that liability shall be to the fed-
eral government and to any State for damage to natural re-
sources belonging to, managed, or controlled by the State. Id.
§ 9607(f)(1). Two well-reasoned federal court decisions have
concluded that CERCLA's expansive definition of "State" is
broad enough to encompass local governments. Legislative
history shows that Congress effectively codified these judicial
interpretations by refusing to alter the statutory definition
[Vol. 7
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when it enacted the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100
Stat. 1613 (1986).
Allowing cities to serve as trustees is also necessary to
carry out CERCLA's twin goals of (1) protecting and preserv-
ing public health and the environment, and (2) ensuring that
the parties who are responsible for releasing hazardous sub-
stances will bear the costs for remedying the problems they
cause. As this case demonstrates, federal and state authorities
are often overburdened and underbudgeted; in many cases,
only local governments will have the interest and incentive to
protect the resources in their own backyards.
ARGUMENT
I. THE INTERIOR DEPARTMENT, AS A NATURAL
RESOURCES TRUSTEE UNDER CERCLA SECTION
107(F), HAS A NONDISCRETIONARY DUTY TO AS-
SESS AND RECOVER NATURAL RESOURCE
DAMAGES.
Section 301(a)(2) of CERCLA authorizes any person to
file a civil action against "the President or any other officer of
the United States . . . where there is alleged a failure of the
President or of such officer to perform any act or duty [under
CERCLA] ... which is not discretionary with the President or
such other officer." 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)(2).
The City of Northwood qualifies as a person under the
definition in section 101(21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1982)
("The term 'person' means . . . United States Government,
State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a
State, or any interstate body."). Therefore, the city is author-
ized to seek a court order forcing the Interior Department to
perform its nondiscretionary duties as trustee over national
wildlife refuges. As discussed below, the Department's nondis-
cretionary duties include conducting an assessment of the nat-
ural resources damage at the Northwood National Wildlife
Refuge and recovering from the Multi-Chem Chemical Com-
pany for those damages.
1990]
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A. CERCLA's Plain Language Establishes a Nondiscre-
tionary Duty to Perform Damage Assessments.
Under section 107(a) of CERCLA, a party responsible for
the release of a hazardous substance is liable for any injury to
or destruction of natural resources. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). Natu-
ral resources are defined as:
land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drink-
ing water supplies, and other such resources belonging to,
managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or other-
wise controlled by the United States... any State or lo-
cal government, any foreign government, any Indian
tribe, or... any member of an Indian tribe.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(16).
Section 107(f) provides that such liability shall be to the
"United States Government and to any State for natural re-
sources within the State or belonging to, managed by, con-
trolled by, or appertaining to such State." 42 U.S.C. §
9607(f)(1). "The President, or the authorized representative of
any State, shall act on behalf of the public as trustee of such
natural resources to recover for such damages." Id.
The statute, as amended by the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499,
100 Stat. 1613 (1986), requires the President to designate fed-
eral officials who shall act as trustees. 42 U.S.C. §
9607(f)(2)(A). "Such officials shall assess damages for injury
to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources.., for resources
under their trusteeship and may, upon request of and reim-
bursement from a State and at the Federal officials' discre-
tion, assess damages for those natural resources under the
State's trusteeship." Id.
These natural resource damages provisions in CERCLA
establish both a general duty to act as a trustee, and a specific
duty to conduct damage assessments for resources protected
by the trustee. In interpreting these provisions, the court
should keep in mind that "CERCLA is essentially a remedial
statute designed by Congress to protect and preserve public
health and the environment. We are therefore obligated to
[Vol. 7
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol7/iss2/10
BEST APPELLANT BRIEF
construe its provisions liberally to avoid frustration of the
beneficial legislative purposes." Dedham Water Co. v. Cum-
berland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir.
1986).
The duties imposed upon natural resources trustees are
directly applicable to the Interior Department in this case be-
cause the President has delegated the trusteeship over na-
tional wildlife refuges to the Department. Exec. Order No.
12580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923 (1987).
1. The duties of a trustee under general trust law.
The statute does not define the term "trustee." There-
fore, the court must look to its ordinary meaning. "A funda-
mental canon of statutory construction is that, unless other-
wise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their
ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." Perrin v. United
States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979).
At the very least, Congress intended to use the word
"trustee" in its general sense - i.e., as "one in whom an es-
tate, interest or power is vested, under an express or implied
agreement to administer or exercise it for the benefit or use of
another . . . ." Black's Law Dictionary 1357 (5th ed. 1979).
Under this definition, the trustee has certain fiduciary duties
to the beneficiaries of the trust. Most notably, a trustee has
general duties "to take reasonable steps to take and keep con-
trol of the trust property ... to use reasonable care and skill
to preserve the trust property.., and to take reasonable steps
to realize on claims which he holds in trust." Nedd v. United
Mine Workers of America, 506 F. Supp. 891, 900 (M.D. Pa.
1980) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 175-77
(1959)). The latter of these duties is particularly applicable to
the instant case involving natural resource damages. As ex-
plained in the Restatement's comment, "If a third person
commits a tort with respect to the trust property, it is the
duty of the trustee to take reasonable steps to compel him to
redress the tort." Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 177, com-
ment a (1959).
The Interior Department, therefore, has a duty as a natu-
1990]
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ral resources trustee to preserve the trust corpus - in this
case, the Northwood National Wildlife Refuge - and to take
reasonable steps to recover for damages to the refuge. Thus,
the Department has nondiscretionary duties that can be en-
forced through CERCLA's citizen suit provision.
This rule applies even where the trustee is a government
official, as illustrated in the school land trust cases. To protect
against unauthorized diversions of trust property, the courts
adopted a policy "favoring judicial protection of the school
lands trusts." United States v. 111.2 Acres of Land in Ferry
County, Wash., 293 F. Supp. 1042, 1047 (E.D. Wash. 1968)
("[lit has fallen to the courts to protect the trust corpus and
assure that it is devoted solely to support the common
schools.").
2. The duties imposed by the public trust doctrine.
A number of commentators have suggested that Congress,
in using the word "trustee" in CERCLA § 107(f), intended to
invoke the public trust doctrine. "[T]he roles of government
claimants in resource damages proceedings under CERCLA
are consistent with the common law public trust doctrine,
which authorizes a sovereign to act on behalf of the public to
protect natural resources." Menefee, Recovery for Natural
Resource Damages Under Superfund: The Role of the Rebut-
table Presumption, 12 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 15,057,
15,058 (1982). See also Kenison, Bucholz & Mulligan, State
Actions for Natural Resource Damages: Enforcement of the
Public Trust, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,434, 10,435
(1987).
A review of CERCLA's legislative history strongly sug-
gests "that Congress intended to structure CERCLA's natural
resource provisions in accordance with the public trust doc-
trine." Comment, CERCLA's Natural Resource Damage Pro-
visions: A Comprehensive and Innovative Approach to Pro-
tecting the Environment, 45 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1417, 1435
(1988) [hereinafter Comment, Damage Provisions]. As an il-
lustration of this legislative intent, the Senate Environment
and Public Works Committee Report on CERCLA states:
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The Committee found during its own hearings and from
Committee-requested research by the Library of Congress
(Report No. 96-13) that damage to natural resources due
to releases of hazardous wastes is a very serious prob-
lem .... The Committee received testimony indicating
that both short and long-term damages to natural re-
sources resulted from releases of hazardous substances
and that standardized techniques for assessing both the
biological and economic damages from such releases
should be developed. Testimony also indicated that it was
appropriate and necessary for the State or in some in-
stances the Federal Government acting as trustee for such
resources to seek restitution for damages or restoration of
such resources.
S. Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (1980).
One of the biggest problems facing claimants prior to the
enactment of CERCLA was that traditional common law tort
theories did not adequately redress the damages inflicted
upon natural resources. "The legislative history illustrates...
that a motivating force behind the CERCLA natural resource
damage provision was Congress' dissatisfaction with the com-
mon law." State of Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Inte-
rior, 880 F.2d 432, 455 (D.C. Cir. 1989). See also Hazardous
and Toxic Waste Disposal Field Hearings, Joint Hearings
Before the Subcomms. on Environmental Pollution and Re-
source Protection of the Senate Comm. on Environment and
Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 155 (1979) (statement of
Peter H. Weiner, special assistant, California Governor's Of-
fice: "We think it is especially essential, and we know it is
your special interest, to provide for recovery of environmental
damages which otherwise might be difficult to obtain in some
courts."). Id.
One of the most troubling aspects of the common law was
the issue of standing. The courts routinely held that citizens
did not have standing to sue for damages to natural resources,
and the resources themselves do not have standing. See gener-
ally C. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? (1974). There-
fore, in order to allow recovery for damage to natural re-
sources, it was necessary for Congress to create a statutory
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cause of action.
It is important to note, however, that CERCLA does not
merely establish a federal remedy; such a remedy could have
been created simply by declaring that a polluter is liable for
natural resource damages and must compensate the state or
federal government for these damages. This was the approach
taken in the original House version of CERCLA: "In the case
of any such damages or loss with respect to natural resources
owned, controlled, or managed by the United States or by a
State or local government, the liability for such damages or
loss shall be to the United States or to such State or local
government, as the case may be." H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 3071(c)(2). In contrast, the final wording of CERCLA
goes one step further, declaring that the federal and state gov-
ernments are the trustees of these resources. The only logical
reason for inserting this language is to impose duties, as well
as rights, upon the federal and state governments.
Moreover, it appears clear that CERCLA's natural re-
source damage provisions were based upon existing state pro-
grams. For example, the Senate subcommittees heard testi-
mony about Alaska's hazardous waste management program,
which was developed under the state's general environmental
policy "to develop and manage the basic resources of water,
land and air to the end that the State may fulfill its responsi-
bility as trustee of the environment for the present and future
generations." Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal Field
Hearings, Joint Hearings Before the Subcomms. on Environ-
mental Pollution and Resource Protection of the Senate
Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 173 (1979) (statement of Deming Cowles, deputy com-
missioner of the Alaska Department of Environmental
Conservation).
Thus, it appears to presume that Congress intended to
invoke public trust principles when it used the word "trustee"
in CERCLA's natural resource damages provisions.
The district court in the instant case rejected this view of
CERCLA's trust provisions, however, finding that the public
trust doctrine "is too narrow for this." (R. 5). The court cites
to Huffman, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi: A Hidden
[Vol. 7
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol7/iss2/10
BEST APPELLANT BRIEF
Victory for Private Property?, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,051 (1989), to support its decision. This article, how-
ever, is inapposite to the facts of this case.
Huffman's proposition is that the geographic reach of the
public trust doctrine is limited to lands affected by the tides
or underlying navigable waters: "nontidal, nonnavigable wet-
lands are beyond the reach of the public trust doctrine." Id. at
10054. Thus, the lower court appears to be saying that the
public trust doctrine is inapplicable to the nontidal and non-
navigable wetlands and marshes of the Northwood National
Wildlife Refuge.
This view, however, misses the point. The city is not at-
tempting to apply the common law public trust doctrine in
this case. Rather, the city is arguing that Congress has taken
the basic principles of the public trust doctrine - that the
government must protect and preserve such property for the
benefit of the public - and applied these principles to all nat-
ural resources owned or controlled by the government. Thus,
the court is not being asked to expand the geographic reach of
a common law remedy, but to recognize that Congress itself
has expanded that reach by creating a statutory duty that ap-
plies to all of the nation's natural resources.
3. The statutory duty to conduct damage
assessments.
In addition to the general duties implied by CERCLA's
declaration that federal and state officials must act as trustees
over natural resources, CERCLA explicitly imposes upon
these trustees the duty of assessing natural resources
damages.
Section 107(f)(2) expressly states that the President shall
designate federal officials to act as natural resources trustees.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(A). The section goes on to require that
"[s]uch officials shall assess damages for injury to, destruction
of, or loss of natural resources . . .for resources under their
trusteeship and may, upon request of and reimbursement
from a State and at the Federal officials' discretion, assess
damages for those natural resources under the State's trustee-
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ship." Id. The plain language of the statute, therefore, estab-
lishes a nondiscretionary duty for federal officials to conduct
these assessments on federal lands.
Where a statute states that an act "shall" be carried out,
such language generally is regarded as mandatory. See, e.g.,
Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482 (1947). "Though this rule
of construction is not absolute, where the statute's purpose is
the protection of public or private rights, as opposed to
merely providing guidance for government officials, courts
usually interpret 'shall' as imposing mandatory rather than
directory duties." South Carolina Wildlife Fed'n v. Alexan-
der, 457 F. Supp. 118, 130 (D.S.C. 1978).
Also significant is the fact that Congress used the word
"shall" with respect to a federal trustee's duties toward lands
under the federal trusteeship, and "may" with respect to
lands under state trusteeship. When "shall" and "may" are
used in the same document, "'shall' imposes a mandatory ob-
ligation and 'may' grants discretion." Koch Refining Co. v.
United States Dep't of Energy, 504 F. Supp. 593, 596 (D.
Minn. 1980) (citing Farmers' & Merchants Bank v. Federal
Reserve Bank, 262 U.S. 649, 662-63 (1923)). In addition, the
statutory provision uses the words "at the Federal officials'
discretion" with respect to the lands under state trusteeship.
Thus, the wording in section 107(f)(2)(A) makes it clear that
Congress knew how to establish mandatory duties, as opposed
to discretionary duties. The obvious construction of this pro-
vision is that Congress intended to make it mandatory for fed-
eral officials to conduct assessments on federal lands, but gave
them discretion to conduct such assessments on state lands.
The mandatory character of the statutory provisions is
consistent with CERCLA's dual purposes of protecting and
preserving natural resources and the public health, and ensur-
ing "that those responsible for problems caused by the dispo-
sal of chemical poisons bear the costs and responsibility for
remedying the harmful conditions they created." Dedham
Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074,
1081 (1st Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v. Reilly Tar &
Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982)). A
natural resources trustee can recover from a responsible party
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only after the damages to a natural resource have been as-
sessed. Therefore, in order to fulfill the statutory purpose, the
trustees must assess these natural resource damages.
Moreover, legislative history on SARA demonstrates that
the language in section 107(f)(2) was added to "clarify existing
language about the responsibilities of Federal and State natu-
ral resources trustees." H.R. Rep. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 1, at 133, reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad-
min. News 2835, 2915. The House Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries expressly states:
The primary obligations of the federal trustees under
CERCLA are twofold. The trustees are directed to assess
the damages to natural resources under their authority in
order to determine the degree of injury and the value of
the damages resulting from the releases. With this infor-
mation, they are then directed to bring actions against re-
sponsible parties to recover the damages to the natural
resources and to use the sums recovered to restore the
natural resources.
H.R. Rep. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 39, re-
printed in 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3068, 3069.
Thus, it seems clear that CERCLA imposes a nondiscretion-
ary duty, enforceable through the statute's citizen suit provi-
sions, to perform natural resource damage assessments and to
attempt to recover damages from the responsible party.
B. CERCLA's Natural Resource Damage Provisions are
not a Matter of Prosecutorial Discretion.
The lower court erred in finding that the Interior Depart-
ment's decision of whether to perform a natural resource dam-
age assessment is an enforcement decision which is within the
agency's discretion, and that the court therefore lacks subject
matter jurisdiction under CERCLA's citizen suit provision to
force the Department to conduct the assessment. (R. 5).
The United States Supreme Court, in Heckler v. Chaney,
470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985), held that an agency's decision not to
take enforcement action is immune from judicial review be-
[14]
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cause such decisions traditionally have been "committed to
agency discretion." However, the court emphasized that an
enforcement decision is only presumptively unreviewable.
[Tihe presumption may be rebutted where the substan-
tive statute has provided guidelines for the agency to fol-
low in exercising its enforcement power.... Congress may
limit an agency's exercise of enforcement power if it
wishes, either by setting substantive priorities, or by oth-
erwise circumscribing an agency's power to discriminate
among issues or cases it will pursue.
Id. at 832-33 (footnote omitted).
In this case, Congress has circumscribed the Interior De-
partment's power by explicitly requiring the Department to
conduct natural resource damage assessments whenever there
has been an injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural re-
sources under section 107(a) of CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)
& (f).
Thus, this case is analogous to Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421
U.S. 560 (1975), where the Court held that judicial review was
available in a suit filed under section 482 of the Labor-Man-
agement Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 482. The
statute in that case provided that, when a union member has
filed a complaint regarding violations of the act, "[tlhe Secre-
tary shall investigate such complaint and, if he finds probable
cause to believe that a violation... has occurred ... he shall.
.. bring a civil action ... ." Id. The Court, in its later opinion
in Heckler v. Chaney, explained that judicial review was avail-
able in Dunlop because the statute "quite clearly withdrew
discretion from the agency and provided guidelines for exer-
cise of its enforcement power." 470 U.S. at 834.
In the case at bar, CERCLA likewise sets precise guide-
lines for the agency to follow: the agency must conduct a dam-
age assessment whenever there has been "an injury to, de-
struction of, or loss of natural resources . . . ." 42 U.S.C. §
9607(f)(2)(A). Because the agency's refusal to initiate the
damage assessments is "a clear abdication of the agency's
statutory responsibilities," the court may order the agency to
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make the assessments. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lo-
rion, 470 U.S. 729, 751 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Furthermore, section 107(f)(2)(A)'s requirement that
trustees conduct damage assessments is not an enforcement
decision at all. Rather, it is more like the investigation re-
quirement in the statute at issue in Dunlop. There, the Secre-
tary of Labor did not dispute the fact that he was required to
investigate all complaints to determine whether there was
probable cause that a violation occurred. The Secretary
merely argued that after making this determination, the Sec-
retary had discretion to prosecute the violation. Similarly,
under CERCLA, the natural resources trustees are required to
conduct damage assessments to determine the extent of the
injury to or destruction of the natural resource. If there is any
prosecutorial discretion at all, such discretion would apply
only to the trustee's decision on whether to file a claim against
the responsible party to recover for those damages.
When viewed from this perspective, CERCLA's natural
resource damage provisions are more analogous to the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act's requirement that federal
agencies "shall" complete an environmental impact statement
for "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). It is
beyond question that the courts may review an agency's com-
pliance with NEPA's requirements. In Calvert Cliffs' Coordi-
nating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n,
449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971), for example, the court
flatly rejected the agency's argument that "the vagueness of
the NEPA mandate and delegation leaves much room for dis-
cretion . . . ." Instead, the court found that section 102 of
NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332, "mandates a particular sort of care-
ful and informed decision-making process and creates judi-
cially enforceable duties." 449 F.2d at 1115. Similarly, judicial
review must be available where Congress has mandated that
natural resources trustees conduct damage assessments.
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C. Protection of the Nation's Natural Resources is a
Top Priority Under CERCLA.
The Interior Department has responded that it would like
to conduct a damage assessment at the Northwood National
Wildlife Refuge, but lacks the funds to do so. (R. 4). The De-
partment admits that it has $100 million in its general operat-
ing budget for the wildlife refuges. (R. 4). But the Department
had decided that daily upkeep of the refuges and long-
planned repairs and improvements to refuge buildings
throughout the system are a higher priority than funding the
natural resources damage assessment at Northwood. (R. 4). As
demonstrated below, the Department's budgetary priorities
run directly contrary to the priorities established by Congress
under CERCLA. Moreover, CERCLA's goal is to have the re-
sponsible parties pay for natural resource damages - includ-
ing the cost of damage assessments. Thus, the agency can es-
cape its funding dilemma by contracting with Multi-Chem to
have the company itself conduct the assessment.
1. Mandatory duties should take precedence in
agency budgetary decisions.
The Interior Department apparently contends that it has
full discretion over how it may spend its general appropriation
for wildlife refuge operations. There is some authority for the
proposition that a lump-sum appropriation "leaves it to the
recipient agency ... to distribute the funds among some or all
of the permissible objects as it sees fit." International Union,
United Auto., Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers
of Am. v. Donovan, 746 F.2d 855 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Given this
discretion, the agency's decision would not be subject to judi-
cial review. Id. at 863.
However, Justice Scalia's opinion in the UA W case makes
it clear that there are some instances in which an agency may
be constrained to expend a certain portion of a lump-sum ap-
propriation on a particular program. Id. at 863 n.5. Justice
Scalia explains that one such constraint would arise where a
substantive statute establishes a system of statutory entitle-
ment over which the agency has no control. Id.
[17]
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Similarly, an agency should be constrained to expend a
portion of a lump-sum budget for activities which are man-
dated by Congress. To hold otherwise would allow agencies to
substitute their priorities for those priorities mandated by
Congress. Such a result would run counter to the tripartite
system of government, where each branch has certain defined
functions established by the Constitution. Tennessee Valley
Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978).
While "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is," . . . it is
equally - and emphatically - the exclusive province of
the Congress not only to formulate legislative policies and
mandate programs and projects, but also to establish
their relative priority for the Nation. Once Congress, ex-
ercising its delegated powers, has decided the order of
priorities in a given area, it is for the Executive to admin-
ister the laws and for the courts to enforce them when
enforcement is sought.
Id. The Executive's duty to administer the laws is expressly
stated in the Constitution, which provides that the President
"shall take care that the Laws be faithfully executed ... .
U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. If the agency lacks sufficient funding
in its general budget to carry out a legislative mandate, the
agency should point this out to Congress. See Campbell v.
United States Dep't of Agric., 515 F. Supp. 1239, 1249
(D.D.C. 1981) ("If in fact Congress has set [agency officials]
with an impossible task, their remedy is with Congress and
not this Court.").
In the case at bar, the Interior Department's refusal to
ask Congress for a line-item appropriation to pay for the dam-
age assessment is indicative of the Department's desire to cir-
cumvent the will of Congress. The Department's fear is that if
the request were granted, the money would come out of the
Department's general appropriation, thus reducing the
amount of funds available for the other refuge operations. (R.
4, 5). That may well be the case, but this is precisely the type
of decision that should be left to Congress. In effect, by failing
to ask Congress for a line-item appropriation, and by refusing
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to spend its lump-sum appropriation for the damage assess-
ment, the Interior Department is usurping the legislative pow-
ers of Congress. See Local 2677, The Am. Fed'n of Gov't Em-
ployees v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60, 75 (D.D.C. 1973); see also
State of La. ex rel. Guste v. Brinegar, 388 F. Supp. 1319, 1325
(D.D.C. 1975) ("To contend that the obligation imposed upon
the president to see the laws faithfully executed, implies a
power to forbid their execution, is a novel construction of the
constitution and entirely impermissible.").
By enacting the natural resources damage provisions of
CERCLA, Congress has made the determination that preser-
vation of the nation's natural resources is of top priority.
Thus, Congress has spoken "in the plainest of words, making
it abundantly clear that the balance has been struck in favor
of" protecting natural resources and recovering from parties
who injure or destroy such resources. See Tennessee Valley
Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 194. It is not for the Interior Depart-
ment to decide that the money would be better spent on re-
pairs or improvements to the buildings on refuges throughout
the system. Indeed, it makes no sense to pay for improve-
ments that eventually may be left to waste on a wildlife refuge
that must be abandoned due to contamination.
2. CERCLA provides alternative funding
sources.
As a practical matter, the Interior Department need not
rely solely upon its own budget to finance the natural re-
sources damage assessment at the Northwood National Wild-
life Refuge. Congress has provided two funding options that
may alleviate the Department's budget concerns.
First, the major objective behind CERCLA's natural re-
source damage provisions is to make responsible parties pay
for the harm they have caused. "In order to preserve the pub-
lic trust in the Nation's natural resources, [CERCLA] estab-
lishes strict liability for [natural resource damages]." S. Rep.
No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (1980). Under section 107(a)
parties responsible for releasing a hazardous substance shall
be liable for "damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of
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natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing
such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a re-
lease." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (emphasis added). Thus, natural
resources trustees can collect from the responsible party not
only for the actual damages, but also for the costs of assessing
the damages.
Moreover, the legislative history of SARA suggests that
natural resources trustees also have the option of having the
responsible party conduct the damage assessment. The House
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee identified this op-
tion by stating, "[o]f course, by specifying that the federal
natural resources trustees shall assess damages, the Commit-
tee does not intend to foreclose their flexibility to reach agree-
ments with potentially responsible parties whereby the parties
themselves undertake the assessments." H.R. Rep. No. 253,
99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 49 (1985), reprinted in 1986
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3068, 3079. Delegation of the
assessment task to potentially responsible parties is author-
ized in the Department's regulations.
At the option of the authorized official and if agreed to by
any potentially responsible party or parties acting jointly,
the potentially responsible party or any other party under
the direction, guidance, and monitoring of the authorized
official may implement all or any part of the Assessment
Plan finally authorized by the authorized official.
43 C.F.R. § 11.32(d). The regulation was upheld in State of
Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432,
466-67 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
Given this option, the Interior Department may choose to
contract to have Multi-Chem conduct the damage assessment,
thereby avoiding the necessity of paying for these costs up
front and later seeking reimbursement from Multi-Chem
under section 107(a). If Multi-Chem is unwilling to make such
an agreement, however, the Department can still conduct the
assessment out of its own budget and file a claim against
Multi-Chem for the costs.
The 1986 amendments to CERCLA also preserved the
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Department's right to seek reimbursement from the
Superfund for natural resource damage assessments. Although
the 1986 amendments provided that "[n]o natural resource
claim may be paid by the Fund unless the President has de-
termined that the claimant has exhausted all administrative
and judicial remedies to recover the amount of such claim
from [the responsible parties]," Congress expressly excluded
the costs of natural resource damage assessments from this
provision. 42 U.S.C. § 9611(b)(2).
II. CERCLA AUTHORIZES THE CITY TO BRING AN
ACTION ON ITS OWN BEHALF AS A NATURAL RE-
SOURCES TRUSTEE.
CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions, when
considered as a whole, allow municipalities to act as natural
resources trustees and to bring their own actions for natural
resource damages. This view, which has been adopted by the
two federal courts that have considered the issue, is supported
not only by the plain language of the act but also by legisla-
tive history. More importantly, however, acknowledgement of
a municipality's right to act as a natural resources trustee is
vital to the underlying objectives of CERCLA - in many
cases, a local government is the only party with sufficient in-
terest and incentive to take the necessary action.
A. CERCLA's Plain Language Allows Municipalities to
Act as Natural Resources Trustees.
CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions are scat-
tered throughout the Act. In order to determine the precise
scope and meaning of each provision, each section of the Act
must be carefully pieced together and read in context. "It is a
generally accepted precept of interpretation that statutes or
regulations are to be read as a whole, with 'each part or sec-
tion ... construed in connection with every other part or sec-
tion.' American Fed'n of Gov't Employees Local 2782 v.
Federal Labor Relations Auth., 803 F.2d 737, 740 (D.C. Cir.
1986).
As a starting point, section 107(a) provides that a respon-
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sible party shall be held liable for "damages for injury to, de-
struction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reason-
able costs of assessing such injury, destruction or loss. . . ." 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a). Natural resources are defined as
land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drink-
ing water supplies, and other such resources belonging to,
managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or other-
wise controlled by the United States ... any State or lo-
cal government, any foreign government, any Indian
tribe, or ... any member of an Indian tribe.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(16) (emphasis added).
Section 107(f) provides that liability for natural resource
damages shall be to the "United States Government and to
any State for natural resources within the State or belonging
to, managed by, controlled by, or appertaining to such State."
42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (emphasis added). "The President, or
the authorized representative of any State, shall act on be-
half of the public as trustee of such natural resources to re-
cover for such damages." Id. (emphasis added).
Because this language refers to the federal government
and states, it is necessary to examine the Act's definition of a
"State" to determine whether it also covers local governments.
The definitions section of CERCLA provides:
The terms "United States" and "State" include the sev-
eral States of the United States, the District of Columbia,
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American Sa-
moa, the United States Virgin Islands, the Common-
wealth of the Northern Marianas, and any other territory
or possession over which the United States has
jurisdiction.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(27) (emphasis added).
1. CERCLA's definition of "State" includes cities.
The two courts that have considered the issue thus far
have ruled that municipalities may sue for natural resource
damages under CERCLA § 107(f). City of New York v. Exxon
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Corp., 633 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Mayor of Boonton v.
Drew Chem. Corp., 621 F. Supp. 633 (D.N.J. 1985). Both
courts rejected the argument that local governments cannot
act as trustees because the Act specifies that liability is "to
the United States or to any State." Exxon, 633 F. Supp. at
619; Drew Chem., 621 F. Supp. at 666.
Arguably, the normal meaning of the word "state" would
not include political subdivisions of the state. However, the
New York court said that such a literal reading of the statute
would "disregard Judge Learned Hand's sage advice 'not to
make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that
statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish,
whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest
guide to their meaning.'" Exxon, 633 F. Supp. at 619.
More importantly, such an argument ignores the fact that
Congress has supplied a definition of the word "state" within
CERCLA, and that definition is controlling. City of New York
v. Exxon Corp., 697 F. Supp. 677, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (citing
Conoco, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 622 F.2d
796, 800 (5th Cir. 1980)). "Legislative declaration of the
meaning that a term shall have in the same or other acts is
binding, so long as the prescribed meaning is not so discor-
dant to common usage as to generate confusion." 2A N.
Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47.07 (4th ed.
1984).
As the New Jersey court pointed out, it is significant that
CERCLA's definition does not provide "that the term 'State'
means the several states, but instead specifically provides that
the term 'state' shall 'include' the entities listed in §
9601(27)." Drew Chem., 621 F. Supp. at 666 (emphasis in
original).
A term whose statutory definition declares what it "in-
cludes" is more susceptible to extension of meaning by
construction than where the definition declares what a
term "means." It has been said "the word 'includes' is
usually a term of enlargement, and not of limitation....
It, therefore, conveys the conclusion that there are other
items includable, though not specifically enumerated ......
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Id. (quoting 2A N. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construc-
tion § 47.07 (4th ed. 1984)).
The New Jersey court thus concluded that CERCLA's
broad definition "explicitly contemplates an expansion of the
illustrative list by the courts to the fullest extent where to do
so would be consistent with the remedial intent of the Act."
Id. at 666. As explained in the following section, municipali-
ties must be included within the term "state" in order to carry
out the principal objectives of CERCLA.
The court also observed that Congress has frequently de-
fined the word "state" to include governmental subdivisions
as well as the fifty states. Id. at 667 (listing thirteen statutes
with a broad definition of state). Although CERCLA does not
expressly define "state" to include municipalities, the court
said, "it is reasonable to expand the illustrative list intro-
duced by the word 'includes' to encompass entities frequently
explicitly within the meaning of the term 'state' as legisla-
tively defined." Id.
It should be noted that one federal court has construed
CERCLA's definition of "state" to exclude municipalities.
City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 713 F. Supp. 1484
(E.D. Pa. 1989). That court decision, however, involved a mu-
nicipality's attempt to recover response costs under section
107(a)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A), as opposed to a claim
for natural resource damages. As illustrated below, this dis-
tinction is significant.
2. Municipalities must be allowed to protect their
own natural resources.
Perhaps the most compelling argument for including mu-
nicipalities within CERCLA's definition of a "state" is the
fact that the natural resources protected by CERCLA include
those resources "belonging to, managed by, held in trust by,
appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by" local govern-
ments. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16). As the New Jersey court pointed
out:
It would be anomalous for this far reaching remedial stat-
ute to give states a cause of action for damages to natural
[24]
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resources owned by the State but for it to exclude cities
from access to such a cause of action while expressly in-
cluding resources owned by "local governments" within
the scope of the protected subject of § 9607(a)(4)(C).
Drew Chem., 621 F. Supp. at 666.
This view also was supported in the Exxon case, where
the New York federal court observed that:
[t]he clear purpose of the Act, which is to ensure prompt
and effective cleanup of hazardous wastes and the resto-
ration of environmental quality, is not advanced by
preventing the authorities entrusted with the manage-
ment of public resources from bringing actions to recover
the cost of protecting them.
Exxon, 633 F. Supp. at 619.
The importance of this justification was highlighted in
the Stepan Chemical case, where the court declined to give an
expansive reading to the term "state." 713 F. Supp. at 1487-
90. The one important distinction between Stepan Chemical
and the Drew Chemical decision is the fact that Stepan
Chemical involved a municipality's claim for response costs.
In contrast, Drew Chemical, Exxon, and the case at bar all
involve a municipality's claim for natural resource damages.
The Stepan Chemical court noted this distinction in refusing
to follow Drew Chemical's interpretation of the word "state."
[The Drew Chemical court's] decision to allow Boonton
to proceed as a state under section 107(a)(4)(A) was un-
doubtedly influenced by its corollary decision that munic-
ipalities should be able to recover for damage to their nat-
ural resources under section 107(a)(4)(C). In this case, the
City, in contrast, has made no claim for damages to natu-
ral resources and does not seek to proceed pursuant to
section 107(a)(4)(C).
Id. at 1489. Therefore, the lower court erred in relying upon
the Stepan Chemical decision to hold that a municipality
cannot serve as a natural resources trustee.
In the case at bar, the City of Northwood does not own or
[25]
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manage the Northwood National Wildlife Refuge. However,
the refuge is "controlled by" and "appertaining to" the city,
and thus comes within CERCLA's definition of natural re-
sources in section 101(16). 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16). The refuge is
"controlled by" Northwood because the city's ordinances ap-
ply within the refuge and the city provides governmental ser-
vices such as trash collecting and fire protection to the refuge.
The word control means to "regulate" or "govern." Black's
Law Dictionary 298 (5th ed. 1979).
The refuge is "appertaining to" the city due to the fact
that the city's boundaries completely encompass the refuge.
The word "appertain" means "[t]o belong to; to have relation
to; to be appurtenant to." Id. at 90. The word "appurtenant"
means "[b]elonging to; accessory or incident to; adjunct, ap-
pended or annexed to . . . ." Id. at 94. The wildlife refuge is
thus appurtenant to the City of Northwood by virtue of the
fact that it is not only attached or annexed to the city, but
indeed is a vital part of the city's environment and identity.
B. Legislative History Supports the Interpretation that
Municipalities May Act as Natural Resources
Trustees.
Congress, in enacting on the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100
Stat. 1613 (1986), implicitly endorsed the Drew Chemical and
Exxon decisions allowing municipalities to act as natural re-
sources trustees.
More precisely, the bill offered by the House of Repre-
sentatives would have excluded units of local government
from the definition of "United States" and "State" under sec-
tion 101(27) of CERCLA. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 962, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 185 (1986). The Conference Report, however,
omitted the House language, thus leaving CERCLA's defini-
tion of "state" unchanged. In explaining its action, the confer-
ence committee stated: "The conference substitute does not
include the House amendment to this definition of 'State'
leaving it to the court's interpretation of this provision." Id.
(emphasis added).
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This language is significant in light of the fact that both
the Exxon and the Drew Chemical decisions had been ren-
dered and published prior to the adoption of the 1986 amend-
ments. In fact, Senator Lautenberg, who was a member of the
conference committee, stated during the floor debate that the
final version of the amendment contained in the Conference
Report would "uphold the Boontori decision allowing munici-
palities to sue for cost recovery under the same Superfund
provisions available to States, and to serve as trustees for nat-
ural resource damages." 135 Cong. Rec. S14912 (daily ed. Oct.
3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
Thus Congress, in refusing to alter CERCLA's definition
of "state" when re-authorizing CERCLA in 1986, has effec-
tively codified the Drew Chemical interpretation. "Congress is
presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial inter-
pretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it
re-enacts a statute without change . . . ." Lorillard v. Pons,
434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978). In the case at bar, this presumption
is bolstered by the fact that Senator Lautenberg directed at-
tention to the Drew Chemical decision during the floor debate
on the final bill.
The fact that SARA also included specific language di-
recting the Governors of each state to delegate state trustees
does not contradict this result. The new language states that
"[t]he Governor of each State shall designate State officials
who may act on behalf of the public as trustees for natural
resources . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
The selective use of both mandatory and permissive verbs
reveals that Congress intended to require that governors must
appoint certain trustees, but once appointed, these officials
may act as trustees, "clearly denoting that others may also act
in such capacity." Maraziti, Local Governments: Opportuni-
ties to Recover for Natural Resource Damages, 17 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,036, 10,039 (1987) (emphasis added).
Thus, this language should be construed as an action-
forcing mechanism - designed to compel states to focus on
the issue of natural resource damage recovery - rather than
mandating that only those officials selected by the governors
shall be eligible to act as natural resources trustees. Id. The
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latter reading would be incorrect because it would be contrary
to the overwhelming evidence described above that indicates
Congress specifically intended to allow municipalities to serve
as natural resources trustees. Id. Moreover, neither the Con-
ference Report nor the amendments themselves mention that
the appointed officials shall be the exclusive trustees. Id.
C. Municipalities Must Be Allowed to Protect Natural
Resources as a Matter of Sound Public Policy.
The circumstances surrounding the contamination of the
Northwood National Wildlife Refuge provide a classic illustra-
tion of why municipalities should be allowed to serve as natu-
ral resources trustees. It is clear from the facts of this case
that if the city does not take action to recover for these dam-
ages, then nobody will.
The City of Northwood clearly has a large stake in the
environmental vitality of the Northwood National Wildlife
Refuge. Indeed, the city's own economic well-being rests in
large part upon the existence of the refuge. In addition, the
citizenry has strong emotional ties with the refuge and its
wildlife; the refuge offers recreational as well as the aesthetics
of a natural environment. Therefore, the city has many strong
incentives for protecting this resource.
Federal and state officials, on the other hand, have no
strong ties to the refuge. To the Interior Department, this ref-
uge is just one of many within the National Wildlife Refuge
System. Similarly, to state officials, this refuge is just one of
many resources under the state's control.
Thus it seems clear that given the budgetary constraints
of the federal and state governments, many of the nation's
natural resources will be vulnerable to the ravages of hazard-
ous waste unless the local governments take action. This re-
sult is contrary to CERCLA's twin goals of (1) protecting and
preserving public health and the environment, and (2) ensur-
ing that the parties who are responsible for releasing hazard-
ous substances will bear the costs for remedying the problems
they cause. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy,
Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986).
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The past tendency to look primarily to federal and state
officials to take the lead in responding to the problem has
led to disappointment and frustration. It is clear that the
hazardous waste problem is so great that federal and state
authorities will continue to be overburdened in their at-
tempts to respond adequately. If responsibility to recover
for damages to natural resources were left exclusively
with agencies whose capabilities are already strained,
many claims would never be asserted. The manifest in-
tent of CERCLA - to place the costs of, pollution
cleanup on the polluters - would be thwarted.
Maraziti, Local Governments: Opportunities to Recover for
Natural Resource Damages, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,036, 10,039 (1987).
Therefore, it is imperative that this court recognize a mu-
nicipality's ability to serve as a natural resources trustee
under CERCLA - particularly if the court finds that it lacks
authority under CERCLA's citizen suit provision to order the
Interior Department to perform the damage assessment. If
federal and state trustees cannot be made to take action, and
local governments cannot serve as trustees, we are once again
left with the common law dilemma that CERCLA was in-
tended to correct - i.e., where "a homeowner could enjoin a
neighbor from harming his or her land and could recover
damages for injury to it, [but] public natural resources lacked
a clear champion." Anderson, Natural Resource Damages,
Superfund, and the Courts, 16 B. C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 405,
406 (1989).
CONCLUSION
This court must reverse the lower court's dismissal of the
City of Northwood's suit against the Interior Department and
Multi-Chem Chemical Company. As the foregoing discussion
demonstrates, section 107(f) of CERCLA creates a nondiscre-
tionary duty for the Interior Department to act as a natural
resources trustee and to conduct damage assessments for re-
sources protected by the trustee. Therefore, the lower court
erred in ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under
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CERCLA's citizen suit provision to force the Interior Depart-
ment to conduct a damage assessment at the Northwood Na-
tional Wildlife Refuge.
The lower court's ruling that a municipality may not
serve as a natural resources trustee is equally in error. As two
prior federal courts have found, CERCLA's natural resource
damage provisions, when taken in context and read as a
whole, require that municipalities be allowed to act as trustees
to preserve their own natural resources. Thus, the city's claim
against Multi-Chem should also be allowed to continue.
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